Washington – On September 18, 2026, President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (H.R. 5334) into law. The bill expands the United States’ sanctions toolkit against both Russia and Iran and grants the administration new authority to impose steep import duties on countries that continue buying Russian energy.
Major Provisions
The act introduces several mechanisms that could reshape global energy trade:
- Tariffs up to 100 %: The President may levy customs duties of up to one‑hundred percent on goods originating from any nation identified as a top‑five buyer of Russian crude oil or natural gas during the previous twelve months.
- Conditional Gas Exemption: A state can avoid gas‑related tariffs if Russian gas shipments to it represent less than 15 % of Russia’s total gas exports for the reference period and the country has demonstrably reduced its reliance on that supply.
- Waiver Power: The law permits the President to suspend or modify specific sanctions when national security or humanitarian considerations justify such action.
Targeting the ‘Shadow Fleet’ and Defense Links
The legislation broadens the scope of existing measures to include individuals and firms tied to Russia’s so‑called “shadow fleet” – a shadowy network of vessels and service providers accused of ferrying sanctioned energy cargoes and evading Western restrictions. It also extends punitive reach to entities connected to Russia’s defense sector that facilitate sanctions‑busting activities.
Implementation Timeline
The statute becomes operative within thirty days of the President’s signature, meaning its tariff and sanction mechanisms could affect trade flows as early as October 2026. Countries that maintain sizable imports of Russian oil or gas should anticipate heightened scrutiny and potential fiscal penalties.
"The new law gives Washington a powerful lever to pressure the world’s biggest purchasers of Russian energy," a senior administration official said.
Overall, the act strengthens the United States’ ability to coerce compliance with its foreign‑policy objectives, while offering a limited pathway for nations that can prove they are moving away from Moscow’s energy exports.
